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East Asians and Westerners perceive the world and think about it
in very different ways. Westerners are inclined to attend to some
focal object, analyzing its attributes and categorizing it in an effort
to find out what rules govern its behavior. Rules used include
formal logic. Causal attributions tend to focus exclusively on the
object and are therefore often mistaken. East Asians are more
likely to attend to a broad perceptual and conceptual field, noticing
relationships and changes and grouping objects based on family
resemblance rather than category membership. Causal attributions
emphasize the context. Social factors are likely to be important in
directing attention. East Asians live in complex social networks
with prescribed role relations. Attention to context is important to
effective functioning. More independent Westerners live in less
constraining social worlds and have the luxury of attending to the
object and their goals with respect to it. The physical ‘‘affordances’’
of the environment may also influence perception. The built
environments of the East are more complex and contain more
objects than do those of the West. In addition, artistic products of
the East emphasize the field and deemphasize individual objects,
including people. Western art renders less of the field and empha-
sizes individual objects and people.
Psychologists and philosophers have long assumed that basicprocesses of cognition and perception are universal, that
inductive and deductive inference, attention, memory, catego-
rization, and causal analysis are the same for everyone in every
culture. Historians and philosophers of science, however, have
raised the possibility that, at least for ancient Chinese and Greek
scientists and philosophers, conceptions of the world and the
cognitive processes used to understand it were very different
(e.g., refs. 1–3). For example, although the Greeks formalized
logic and made use of it for many cognitive operations, including
geometry, the Chinese never formalized logic, and indeed,
except for two brief periods around the third century B.C., never
had much concern with logic at all (4). Presumably as a conse-
quence, the ancient Chinese made little progress in geometry
despite the fact that they made great strides in arithmetic and
algebra (1).
Another example concerns metaphysics or fundamental as-
sumptions about the nature of the world, together with the
cognitive processes that followed from the metaphysical assump-
tions. The Greeks tended to focus on the object and to explain
its behavior with reference only to its properties and the
categories to which it belonged. Aristotle explained a stone’s
falling when placed in water by invoking the notion that the stone
had the property of ‘‘gravity,’’ and explained a piece of wood’s
f loating on water by reference to the wood’s property of ‘‘levity.’’
In contrast, the Chinese recognized that action always occurs in
a field of forces, understood much about magnetism and acous-
tics, and recognized the true reason for the tides (which escaped
even Galileo). The Greeks were inclined to see matter as being
composed of discrete objects or atoms, whereas the Chinese
were disposed to see matter as continuous substances, even as
interpenetrating substances. Finally, the Greeks tended to see
stability in the world (e.g., Plato’s forms), whereas the Chinese
saw the world as constantly changing, indeed, in line with the yin
and yang of the Tao, as always being in the process of reverting
to the opposite of the current state.
Nisbett and his colleagues (5, 6) have proposed that ancient
Greek thought can be described as analytic, meaning that the
focus of attention was on some salient object; the properties of
the object were assessed and the object was assigned to a
category with the intention of finding the rules that governed its
behavior. Relevant rules were sometimes of the most abstract
kind, namely logical rules, and the focus on the rules governing
the object’s behavior gave the Greeks a sense of control over the
object. Ancient Chinese thought, in contrast, was holistic, mean-
ing that the Chinese attended to the field in which a salient object
was located; relationships among objects and events in the field
were noticed, but specific object properties and categories were
of relatively little interest. Frequently lacking explicit rules about
the object’s behavior, the Chinese had relatively little sense of
personal agency or control. Substituting for logical rules were a
variety of dialectical schemas, including finding the ‘‘middle
way’’ between two apparently contradictory propositions and
recognizing the importance of the context in making judgments
about objects and individuals.
Why might the ancient Chinese and Greeks have had such
different ways of thinking about the world? Various writers have
proposed that the reasons have to do with the differing social
practices of the two societies (e.g., refs. 3 and 7). The Chinese
were engaged in multiple, complex role relations with other
individuals, with the extended family, the village, and the
representatives of the state. The socially interdependent Chinese
would always have been looking outward, trying to coordinate
their actions with those of others while minimizing social fric-
tion. And if, as Markus and Kitayama (8) put it, ‘‘one perceives
oneself as embedded within a larger context of which one is an
interdependent part, it is likely that other objects or events will
be perceived in a similar way.’’ The Greeks, on the other hand,
were relatively independent, having fewer and less complex
social relations than did the Chinese. In addition, the Greeks
valued individualism and autonomy. The independence of their
lives might have given them the luxury of attending to objects in
light of their personal goals in relation to them and might have
encouraged them to see objects, both physical and social, as
distinct and separate.
If ancient Greek and Chinese philosophers differed from one
another because their social systems made it natural for them to
see and process the world as they did, then there would be some
justification for predicting that modern East Asians (China and
the cultures it strongly influenced, including Japan and Korea)
might reason differently from modern Westerners (notably the
people of Europe and the current and former members of the
British Commonwealth). This is because there is substantial
evidence that the current social practices of East and West differ
in ways that parallel those of ancient times.
The Western-style independent and largely unconnected self
is hard for East Asians to comprehend. Philosopher Hu Shih
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states, ‘‘in the Confucian human-centered philosophy man can-
not exist alone; all action must be in the form of interaction
between man and man’’ (9). Anthropologist Edward T. Hall (10)
introduced the concept of ‘‘low context’’ vs. ‘‘high context’’
societies to capture differences in social relations. The Western
self is composed of fixed attributes and can move from one
setting or context to another without significant alteration. But
for East Asians, the person is so connected to others that the self
is literally dependent on the context. As philosopher Donald
Munro put it, East Asians understand themselves ‘‘in terms of
their relation to the whole, such as the family, society, Tao
Principle, or Pure Consciousness’’ (11). If an important person
is removed from the individual’s social network, that individual
literally becomes a different person.
Self-descriptions capture these differences. When asked to
describe the self, Americans and Canadians tend to tell about
their personality traits and attitudes more than do Japanese (12,
13). North Americans tend to overestimate their distinctiveness
(8) and to prefer uniqueness in themselves and in their posses-
sions (8). In one clever study, Koreans and Americans were given
a choice among different colored pens to have as a gift.
Americans chose the rarest color, whereas Koreans chose the
most common color (14).
Training for independence vs. interdependence starts very
early. Whereas it is common for Western babies to sleep in a
different bed from their parents (or even in a different room),
this is rare for Asian babies. Adults from several generations
often surround the Chinese baby, and the Japanese baby is
almost always with its mother. When American mothers play
with their children, they tend to focus their attention on objects
and their attributes (‘‘see the truck; it has nice wheels’’), whereas
Japanese mothers emphasize feelings and relationships (‘‘when
you throw your truck, the wall says, ‘ouch’’’) (33). Koreans are
better able to judge an employer’s true feelings about an
employee from ratings of the employee than are Americans (15).
When we showed participants videos of fish, we found that
Japanese were more likely to see emotions in the fish than were
Americans (16).
Surveys of businesspeople show marked differences between
East and West in concern with harmonious relationships vs.
emphasis on individual performance (17). The differential em-
phasis on relationships can result in conflicts in the world of
business. For example, in the mid-1970s, Japanese refiners
contracted with Australian suppliers to provide them with sugar
for several years at a particular set price. When, the very next
year, the bottom dropped out of the world sugar market, the
Japanese wanted to renegotiate the price; but to the Australians,
a contract was a contract: a fixed, binding instrument that should
not be subject to changes in context or by any desire to maintain
a harmonious relationship with the purchasers.
If it is really the case that contemporary Asian and Western
societies are different in their emphasis on relationships vs.
independent action, then it might be the case that Asia and the
West differ in their cognitive and perceptual habits along the
lines of the holistic vs. analytic stance characteristic of ancient
Chinese vs. ancient Greek science and philosophy. For the past
several years, we and our colleagues have been examining this
possibility in a number of domains.
Cognitive Differences
Our work shows that East Asians and Westerners differ in the
way they make causal attributions and predictions, in reliance on
logic vs. dialectical principles, and in categorization based on
rules vs. family resemblance and categorization based on shared
taxonomic labels vs. relationships.
Causal Attribution and Prediction. We might expect that Western-
ers, like ancient Greek scientists, would be inclined to explain
events by reference to properties of the object and that East
Asians would be inclined to explain the same events with
reference to interactions between the object and the field. There
is much evidence indicating that this is the case (for reviews, see
refs. 18-20). Morris and Peng (21) and Lee et al. (22) have shown
that Americans are inclined to explain murders and sports events
respectively by invoking presumed traits, abilities, or other
characteristics of the individual, whereas Chinese and Hong
Kong citizens are more likely to explain the same events with
reference to contextual factors, including historical ones. Cha
and Nam (23) and Choi and Nisbett (24) found that East Asians
used more contextual information than did Americans in making
causal attributions. The same is true for predictions.
Explanations are different even for events involving animals
and inanimate objects. Morris and Peng (21) showed participants
cartoon displays of an individual fish moving in relation to a
group of fish in various ways. Chinese participants were more
likely to see the behavior of the individual fish as being produced
by external factors, namely the other fish, than were Americans,
whereas American participants were more inclined to see the
behavior as being produced by factors internal to the individual
fish. Peng and Knowles (25) showed that, for ambiguous physical
events involving phenomena that appeared to be hydrodynamic,
aerodynamic, or magnetic, Chinese were more likely to refer to
the field when giving explanations (e.g., ‘‘the ball is more buoyant
than the water’’) than Americans were. The differences in causal
attribution therefore probably reflect deep metaphysical differ-
ences that transcend specific rules about particular domains that
are taught by the culture. In many of the causal attribution
studies, incidentally, it could be shown that the East Asian
tendency to prefer context was more likely to result in a correct
analysis than was the American preference for the object.
Logic vs. Dialectics. When told that all birds have a certain
property, people are more inclined to agree that eagles have the
property than that penguins have the property, even though, if
asked, they would of course say that penguins are birds. Noren-
zayan et al. (26) showed that Korean participants were more
susceptible to this so-called ‘‘typicality’’ effect in deduction.
Koreans were also more likely than Americans to be influenced
by the desirability of a proposition when judging whether it was
logically consistent with propositions to which it was related
deductively. A series of studies by Peng and Nisbett (27) showed
that Chinese are more comfortable with apparent contradictions
than are Americans. They showed that Chinese participants had
a greater preference for proverbs that contain an apparent
contradiction (‘‘too humble is half proud’’) than did American
participants (even when the proverbs were Yiddish ones and
equally unfamiliar to Americans and Chinese). They also found
that the Chinese were more likely to propose ‘‘middle way’’
solutions to inter- and intrapersonal conflicts than were Amer-
icans, who seemed to find it necessary that one side or the other
had to be correct. When presented with evidence for apparently
contradictory propositions, Chinese participants tried to find
truth in both, whereas Americans were more inclined to reject
one proposition in favor of the other.
Categorization. East Asians have been found to classify objects
and events on the basis of relationships and family resemblance,
whereas Americans classify on the basis of rule-based category
membership. Liang-Hwang Chiu (28) showed triplets of objects
like those in Fig. 1 to Chinese and American children and asked
them to indicate which of the two objects went together.
American children put the chicken and the cow together and
justified this by pointing out that ‘‘both are animals.’’ Chinese
children put the cow and the grass together and justified this by
saying that ‘‘the cow eats the grass.’’ Our research group has
found the same sort of differential tendency in college students
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given word triplets to read. Norenzayan et al. (26) asked partic-
ipants to report whether a target object like that at the bottom
of Fig. 2 was more similar to the group of objects on the left or
the group on the right. The target object bears a strong family
resemblance to the group of objects on the left, but there is a rule
that allows placing the object in the group on the right, namely,
‘‘has a straight stem.’’ Fig. 3 shows that East Asians were inclined
to think that the object was more similar to the group with which
it shared a family resemblance, whereas European Americans
were more likely to regard the object as similar to the group to
which it could be assigned by application of the rule. Asian
Americans, although closer to East Asians, showed no overall
preference. (In several of our studies, we have included Asian
Americans. They were always intermediate in their responses
and most typically closer to the European Americans than to the
East Asians.)
Attention and Perception Differences
Differences between East Asians and Westerners extend beyond
cognition to encompass many tasks that are attentional and
perceptual in nature. Asians appear to attend more to the field
and Westerners more to salient objects.
Detection of Covariation. If it is the case that East Asians pay more
attention to the field, we would expect them to be better at
detecting relationships between events. Ji et al. (29) presented
arbitrary objects like those in Fig. 4 to Chinese and American
participants. One of the objects on the left appeared on the left
side of a split computer screen followed rapidly by one of the
objects on the right appearing on the right side of the screen. The
participant’s task was to judge the strength of relationship
between one object appearing on the left and a corresponding
object appearing on the right. The actual strength ranged from
zero, that is, the probability of a particular object on the right
appearing was independent of which object appeared on the left,
to a relationship equal in strength to a correlation of 0.60. The
Chinese participants saw more covariation than did American
participants, they were more confident about their judgments,
and their confidence was better correlated with the actual degree
of covariation. At any rate, all of this was true in the setup just
described. When some control over the setup was given to
participants by giving them a choice as to which object to present
on the left and how long an interval to have before presentation
of the object on the right, American performance was entirely
similar to Chinese performance.
Field Dependence: Difficulty in Separating an Object from Its Sur-
roundings. If it is the case that East Asians are inclined to focus
their attention broadly on the field, then we might expect them
to find it more difficult to make a separation between an object
and the field in which it appears. Such a tendency is called ‘‘field
dependence’’ (30). One of the ways of examining it is the rod and
frame test presented in Fig. 5. The participant looks down a long
Fig. 1. ‘‘Which two go together?’’ Item from Chiu (28) test.
Fig. 2. ‘‘Which group does the target object belong to?’’ Target bears a
family resemblance to group on the left but can be assigned to group on the
right on the basis of a rule.
Fig. 3. Percent of participants basing similarity judgments on family resem-
blance vs. rule.
Fig. 4. Sample of arbitrary objects shown in covariation detection task.
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box at the end of which is a rod whose orientation can be
changed, and a frame around the rod can be moved indepen-
dently of the rod. The participant’s task is to judge when the rod
is vertical. Participants are deemed ‘‘field dependent’’ to the
extent that their judgments of verticality of the rod are influ-
enced by the orientation of the frame. Ji et al. (29) found that
Chinese participants were more influenced by the position of the
frame than were American participants. Although Chinese and
Americans were equally confident of their judgments in the
setup just described, when participants were given control in
the form of being able to position the rod as they wished, the
Americans became more confident than the Chinese (and the
actual performance of American males improved).
Attention to the Field. We presented 20-second animated vi-
gnettes of underwater scenes to Japanese and American partic-
ipants (16). A still photo from one of the videos is presented in
Fig. 6. After seeing each video twice, participants were asked to
report what they had seen. The first sentence was coded as to
whether a participant initially mentioned one of the salient
objects (with ‘‘salience’’ defined as being larger, faster moving,
and more brightly colored than the other objects) or the field
(e.g., water color, f loor of the scene, inert objects). American
participants started their statements by mentioning salient ob-
jects far more frequently than Japanese participants did. In
contrast, Japanese participants began by mentioning informa-
tion about the field almost twice as often as Americans did.
Overall, Japanese actually made 65% more observations about
the field than did Americans. And Japanese participants men-
tioned almost twice as many relations between objects and the
field as did American participants.
After participants had seen 10 vignettes, they were presented
with still photos of 45 objects that they had seen before and 45
that they had not seen. The 45 previously seen objects were
shown either against the original background, no background, or
a novel background, as seen in Fig. 7. The prediction was that,
because they attend to objects in relation to the field, Japanese
participants would be more thrown off by presentation of the
object against the novel field than would Americans. And this
was, in fact, the case. Whereas American performance was
literally unaffected by the background manipulation, the Japa-
nese made substantially more errors when the object was seen
against a novel background than when it was seen against the
original background. (Japanese performance was significantly
better for the no-background condition than for the novel
background condition, but was not significantly worse for the
no-background condition than for the original background
condition.)
Change Blindness. Perceptual psychologists have recently been
studying a phenomenon called ‘‘change blindness’’ (31). When a
picture of a scene and a somewhat altered version of it are
presented sequentially, with just a brief pause in between, people
can find it very difficult to detect changes that are completely
obvious when the two versions are shown side-by-side. This
seems to be produced by an automatic tendency of the nervous
system to render two highly similar scenes into a single consistent
picture, something that the visual system is constantly doing to
maintain a coherent view of the world. If it is the case that East
Asians attend to the field more than do Westerners, then changes
in the field, including relationships between objects, should be
easier for them to detect. If Westerners focus more on objects
and their attributes, then it should be changes in salient objects
that would be easier for them to detect. We presented Japanese
and American participants with scenes like those in Figs. 8 and
9, which are stills from 20-second animated vignettes. The scene
in Fig. 8 is intended to mimic the object-salience of a Western
city and that in Fig. 9 to mimic the field salience, complexity, and
interpenetration characteristic of East Asian cities. Other vi-
gnettes included an object-salient American farm scene and a
Fig. 5. Rod and frame test apparatus.
Fig. 6. Still photo from animated underwater vignette.
Fig. 7. Focal fish previously seen viewed against previously seen background
(Left), no background (Center), or novel background (Right).
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field-salient Japanese farm scene. Finally, two scenes were
intended to be neutral with respect to culture: a construction
scene and an airport scene.
Sensitivity to change was measured by asking participants,
after they had seen two versions of the same scene that had
changes in both salient foreground objects as well as in relation-
ships between objects and less salient background objects, to tell
us which aspects of the scene had changed from the first version
of the vignette to the second. An example of an object change
is Fig. 8 is a change in the front car’s hubcaps. An example of a
relationship change is relocation of the buildings in the back-
ground. An example of a background object change is a change
in the type of buildings in the background. Fig. 10 shows the
differences in changes perceived by Americans and Japanese. It
can be seen that American participants were more likely to
detect changes in salient objects than were Japanese participants,
whereas Japanese participants were more likely to detect
relationship and environment (context) changes than were
Americans.
‘‘Affordances’’ in the Environment. As it happens, the different
environments themselves had an effect on the perception of both
Americans and Japanese. As may be seen in Fig. 11, when the
scenes were intended to resemble American environments, both
Americans and Japanese found it easier to detect object changes
than field changes. When the scenes were intended to resemble
Japanese environments, both Americans and Japanese found it
easier to detect field changes than object changes. These findings
indicate that environmental factors, known as the ‘‘affordances’’
to perception, may contribute to people’s habitual patterns of
attention and perception. When the environment affords mostly
salient, distinctive objects, it may be that people attend to them
to more closely than to the field. When objects are more
numerous, more complex, and more interpenetrating, the dis-
tinction between object and field may become blurred and
relationships and background elements may become relatively
salient.
Of course, these generalizations would be valid only if the
scenes that we composed actually capture real differences in
Eastern and Western environments. To examine this question,
Miyamoto and Nisbett took photographs in front of, to each side
of, and behind three kinds of buildings (post offices, schools, and
hotels) in towns of three different sizes in Japan and America.
Total populations were defined for each type of building in pairs
of towns that were comparable in many respects across the two
nations: New York and Tokyo, the towns of Ann Arbor, MI, and
its ‘‘sister city’’ Hikone, Japan, and the villages of Chelsea, MI,
and Torahime, Japan. Buildings were selected at random from
the populations of each type. American and East Asian college
students were questioned about the photographs, and both
groups reported finding Japanese scenes to have more objects
Fig. 8. Still photo from animated ‘‘American’’ city vignette in change
blindness study.
Fig. 9. Still photo from animated ‘‘Japanese’’ city vignette in change blind-
ness study.
Fig. 10. Focal object and contextual changes detected by Americans (US) and
Japanese (JPN).
Fig. 11. Focal object and contextual changes detected in ‘‘American’’ (US)
and ‘‘Japanese’’ (JPN) environments.
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and more ambiguous boundaries for objects. Each picture was
schematized and assessed for number of objects by using the NIH
IMAGE program for Macintosh. An example of a schematized
picture is shown in Fig. 12. The number of objects in each picture
was assessed based on the number of edges. The more the edges,
the more the objects. The average number of objects defined in
this way was 32% greater for Japanese scenes than for American
scenes. The differences between Japanese and American scenes
were marked at each city size.
Esthetics East and West. Among the affordances of the environ-
ment that may influence perception are the artistic products of
a culture. There are marked differences between Eastern and
Western art, and we and our colleagues Richard Gonzalez and
Letty Kwan have found comparable differences in the way
ordinary college students draw pictures and take photographs of
the environment. East Asian paintings take a very broad per-
spective on the scenes they represent. They tend to put the
horizon high as it would be seen by a bird flying over the
landscape or an artist perched on a high outcropping. Western
landscapes put the horizon low, as it would be seen from the
ground. Consequently, less of the landscape is seen. Eastern
portrait paintings tend to diminish the size and salience of the
central figure relative to Western paintings. The behavior of
ordinary contemporary people duplicates these cultural trends.
When college students are asked to draw a landscape showing at
least a house, a tree, a person, a river and a horizon, East Asian
participants placed the horizon higher and drew more objects
overall than American participants. When Japanese and Amer-
ican students were asked to take a photo of a person, the
Japanese photos showed the person as small relative to the field.
An example of the difference between a Japanese photo and an
American one is shown in Fig. 13. Japanese literally never made
photographs with the person taking up as large a fraction of the
total space as the American photo in Fig. 13, but it was common
for Americans to do so.
Change vs. Stability. The ancient Greeks saw stability in their
worlds; the ancient Chinese saw change. We have maintained
that a contributor to this difference may have been the relative
degree of focus on the object vs. the field. If one is attending
primarily to a focal object and its properties, and assigning it to
an abstract (and static) category, the world may appear to be
stable. But if one is attending to a greater number of objects and
their relationships, the world may appear to be in a constant state
of change. Ji et al. (32) examined assumptions about stability vs.
change in several ways. They described various current states and
asked whether participants thought the state would continue or
change. For example, participants were told about a relationship
between a young man and a young woman and asked if they
thought it would continue in the future. For each of four events,
more Chinese than American participants thought the future
would be different from the past. Ji et al. also presented
participants with alleged recent trends in various parameters that
participants were unlikely to have direct knowledge of, for
example, recent trends in global economy growth rates. Partic-
ipants were shown positively and negatively accelerated growth
and decay trends and asked to make a prediction as to what the
next time step would be like. For all four types of curves, Chinese
participants were more likely to predict that the next time step
would halt or reverse the direction of change. It may be seen in
Fig. 14. that Chinese participants were more likely to predict
reversals of trends in all but 1 of 12 cases.
Perception of Everyday Life Events. The experiments reported to
this point all use materials that to one degree or another depart
from everyday-life objects and events. In a final study to be
reported, Chua and Nisbett studied more naturalistic materials.
They asked American and Taiwanese college students to de-
scribe some personal events (e.g., their first day of the current
Fig. 12. Schematized rendering of a Japanese street scene for the purpose
of assessing number of objects.
Fig. 13. Photos showing different ideas of relation between central figure
and environment in a portrait. (Left) American portrait. (Right) Japanese
portrait.
Fig. 14. Percentage of American and Chinese participants predicting a
reversal in trends. Points 1–3, positively accelerated growth curves; points 4–6,
negatively accelerated growth curves; points 7–9, positively accelerated decay
curves; points 10–12, negatively accelerated decay curves.
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term), to read some narratives (e.g., about a day in the life of a
woman in which everything seemed to prevent her from getting
to work) and then summarize what they had read, and to watch
videos of silent comedies and summarize them. Taiwanese were
randomly selected to write either in Mandarin or in English. The
anticipations were that the Americans would make more men-
tions of the central character than would the Taiwanese and
would make more intentional statements expressive of control
over a situation or desire to achieve control. Taiwanese were
expected to make more comments about the emotional states of
various characters. There were no differences in any of the
variables due to whether it was personal stories, summarized
narratives, or descriptions of the videos that were examined.
Thus, we added all three of these together for purposes of
analysis. It may be seen in Figs. 15-17 that all of the predictions
were borne out and that the results were the same whether the
Taiwanese answered in Mandarin or in English. This latter
finding is consistent with the results of several other studies
showing that language used, and facility of Asians in English
when the testing language is English, are not generally predictive
of results (26).
Discussion
There are marked differences in the cognitive processes of East
Asians and Westerners. These include categorization, causal
attribution, reliance on rules, use of logic, and preference for
dialectical understanding of events. In our view, these cognitive
differences derive in good part from perceptual differences, in
particular, differences in what is attended to. We have shown that
East Asians attend to the field more than do Westerners and that
Westerners pay more attention to focal objects. Attention to the
object encourages categorization of it, application of rules to it,
and causal attribution in terms of it. Attention to the field
encourages noticing relationships and change, and prompts
causal attribution in terms of the context and distal forces. In
addition, attention to the field could be expected to make it
difficult to segregate a particular object from a field in which it
is embedded.
We believe that the differences in attention, perception and
cognition that we have shown are driven by differences in social
structure and social practices that prompt Asians to look to the
environment and allow Westerners the luxury of attending to
some focal object and their goals with respect to it. Sometimes,
although not always, these differences may be caused or en-
hanced by economic factors. We endorse the speculation by
others that East Asians emphasize role relations and social
harmony as much as they do in part because, since ancient times,
they have been primarily farmers, and farmers need to get along
with one another (3, 7). In addition, irrigated agriculture,
characteristic of much of East Asia since ancient times, requires
effective hierarchies, adding more vertical constraints to the
vertical and horizontal constraints within the family and village.
Such an emphasis on social concerns can might possibly have
sustained itself in part out of sheer inertia, for an indefinite
period up to the present. The period may be briefer than one
might assume, however. Our colleague Harold Stevenson
quizzed the mothers of an elementary school in Beijing about
their hopes for their children during a 10-year period encom-
passing a dramatic changeover toward a free market economy.
At the beginning of the period, the mothers had primarily social
concerns for their children, wanting them to be able to fit in and
get along with others. At the end of the period, the mothers had
shifted dramatically in the direction of hoping for their children
to be ambitious and skilled in ways that would serve them in the
new economic circumstances.
The economy of ancient Greece was quite different from that
of East Asia. Greece, consisting substantially of mountains
descending to the sea, did not lend itself to large-scale agricul-
ture. Common occupations such as hunting, fishing, trading, and
keeping kitchen gardens did not require extensive social collab-
Fig. 15. Number of statements referring to central figures minus number of
statements referring to others, by Americans and by Taiwanese tested either
in English or in Mandarin.
Fig. 16. Proportion of statements with intentional content by Americans
and by Taiwanese tested either in English or in Mandarin.
Fig. 17. Proportion of statements with emotional content by Americans and
by Taiwanese tested either in English or in Mandarin.
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oration. In the absence of substantial social concerns and
constraints, attention to a focal object and one’s goals in relation
to it were luxuries that the Greeks could afford. Many aspects of
Western industrial and postindustrial economies in the last 200
years are also characterized by relatively few social constraints,
at least for those in middle-class occupations.
Thus, we believe that there is a causal chain running from
social structure to social practice to attention and perception to
cognition. This account does not accommodate two sets of
findings, however, namely those relating to logic vs. dialectics
and those relating to what appears to be the differing affordances
of Eastern and Western environments, including artistic
productions.
A common account of why Aristotle formalized logic is that he
got tired of hearing poor arguments in the marketplace and the
political assembly (4). Essentially, he was trying to establish that
if an argument had a particular formal structure, then it was a
bad argument regardless of content. That the Chinese would not
have formalized logic, or even have been much concerned with
it, can then be explained in terms of the fact that arguments were
extremely rare because of the threat that they posed to the social
fabric (5). That a dialectical approach to contradiction would
have developed fits with this assumption: the Chinese sought the
‘‘middle way’’ between apparent contradictions. This account of
logic vs. dialects is a direct one from social practice to cognition
that does not make contact with questions of attention or
perception.
That the affordances of Eastern and Western environments
would differ is more of a puzzle. Part of the affordances are the
artistic products that surround the individual. It may be that
Asian artists show much of the field because they are capable of
attending to a great deal of environmental information and
prefer to do so. They may render humans and other salient
objects smaller than do Westerners because these are not so focal
for them. Ordinary people may make drawings and photos the
way they do, and show the artistic preferences they do, in part
because that’s the way the artworks they are accustomed to
seeing usually portray things. On the other hand, given ordinary
people’s habits of attending to the world, it is far from clear that
the examples of artistic products are needed. It is quite possible
that at least part of the field preference of ordinary East Asians,
and the object emphasis of ordinary Westerners, is due to their
respective customary ways of seeing the world.
It is more difficult to explain why the affordances of the built
environment would be so different between East and West. One
possibility seems unlikely: Eastern environments are probably
not more complex simply because of greater population density.
The population density of Tokyo is somewhat greater than that
of New York, and the population density of Torahime is
somewhat greater than that of Chelsea, but the population
density of Ann Arbor is substantially greater than that of
Hikone, and the East–West differences are roughly comparable
for all three city sizes. Perhaps the most plausible explanation of
the greater complexity of Eastern environments is that the
esthetic preferences match the perceptual focus of each group.
Easterners focus broadly on the field and attend to a large
number of elements, and they seem to construct environments
with a large number of elements. Westerners focus more nar-
rowly on a smaller number of elements and they seem to prefer
environments with a smaller number of elements. Our work
suggests that these differences operate in such a way as to
intensify each other: the environments influence perception and
the resulting perceptual preferences prompt people to produce
different environments.
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